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TAKING THE LENDER FOR A RIDE: SECTION 1403 OF
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND THE BUYER IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
When an airplane buyer in the ordinary course of business' purchases
an airplane covered by a security interest recorded under federal law,
2 a
question arises whether the buyer takes the airplane subject to the security
interest under federal law,3 or free of that interest under state law.4 Gener-
ally, an airplane retailer requires financing to purchase his retail stock
from an airplane supplier.5 Lenders loan these needed funds to the retailer,
usually requiring that the newly-acquired airplanes serve as collateral se-
I A buyer in the ordinary course of business is a buyer who, in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him violates the ownership rights or security interest of another,
buys goods in the ordinary course of business from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind. Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 1-201(9) (1972) (unless otherwise indi-
cated, all citations will be to the 1972 text); see U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), (37). Good faith is
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(19). See note 22 infra.
2 A security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). A security interest in airplanes is record-
able only under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970) (F.A.A. or
Act). Section 1403 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish and maintain a system for the
recording of each and all of the following:
(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any
civil aircraft of the United States;
(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such aircraft, aircraft engine or
engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts against any person other than the
person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or
devisee, or any other person having actual notice thereof, until such convenance or
other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion . ...
See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); U.C.C. §§ 9-104(a); 9-307(1); notes 1&2 supra; note 35
infra. See generally Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
See U.C.C. § 9-307(1). Section 9-307(1) states:
A buyer in the ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other
than one buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
Since manufacturers typically do not extend credit to retailers, the retailer usually
operates his business with little liquidity. Retailers generally borrow from a third party lender
in order to purchase goods from the manufacturer. The lender takes a security interest in the
retailer's present and after-acquired inventory. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1). The manufacturer,
after receiving an order from the retailer, ships the goods to that retailer. The manufacturer
then sends an invoice describing the goods to the lender, along with a draft calling for
payment. The lender credits the retailer's account and awaits payment from the retailer, his
security interest attaching to the goods as collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1),(2). This entire
transaction is known as a floor plan. See Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086
(3d Cir. 1978); Suburban Trust & Say. Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 250 N.E.2d 118
(1969). For examples of how floor plans work in the field of aircraft financing, see text
accompanying notes 73 & 99 infra. See generally E. FARNswoRTH & J. HONNOLD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COMMERcIAL LAW 761-71 (3d ed. 1976).
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curing the loan.' To validate the security interest, the lender must record
the interest with the Federal Aviation Agency under the provisions of §
1403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA).' Federal law preempts
inconsistent state legislation.8 Thus, should § 1403 of the FAA grant prior-
ity to a security interest recorded under that section in addition to validat-
ing the interest, that security interest has priority over all other claims to
the airplane, regardless of the result under conflicting state priority law.'
If § 1403 merely validates and does not grant priority to a federally
recorded airplane security interest, each state's priority law applies to
airplanes purchased in that state. 0 Under most state laws, when an air-
plane covered by a federally recorded airplane security interest is sold by
the retailer to the buyer, the lender's security interest prevails over all
other claims to the plane." Should the buyer of the airplane qualify as a
buyer in the ordinary course of business under state law, however, most
states give priority to that buyer's claim over the claim of the holder of a
security interest recorded under § 1403 of the FAA."2 Consequently,
whether the buyer in the ordinary course of business or the lender prevails
depends on whether § 1403 of the FAA preempts state laws favoring the
buyer in the ordinary course of business by granting priority to the feder-
ally recorded interest. 3 All courts agree that § 1403 preempts state security
interest recording laws." The courts are divided, however, on the question
of whether § 1403 grants priority to a security interest recorded under its
provisions, thus preempting state laws favoring the buyer in the ordinary
course of business.
5
State laws regarding the continuation of a security interest in collateral
are contained in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code).
See note 5 supra.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229
(1964); U.C.C. § 9-104(a); note 35 infra.
I DoweU v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970);
see U.C.C. § 9-104(a); note 31 infra.
10 Haynes v. General Elec. Credit Corp. (GECC), 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977),
affl'd, 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp.
121 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964);
see U.C.C. § 9-104(a); note 31 infra.
" See U.C.C. § 9-306(2); note 17 infra.
"Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop
Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F.
Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964); see U.C.C. § 9-307(1); note 4 supra.
11 See, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); see 49 U.S.C. § 1403
(1970); note 2 supra.
" See, e.g., Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978); Northern
Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 384 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank v.
Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Cessna Fin. Co. v. Skyways Enter., Inc., 23
U.C.C. Rptr. 1015 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1978); Suburban Trust & Say. Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio
Misc. 74, 250 N.E.2d 118 (1969).
11 See note 67 infra.
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Section 9-306(2) provides that, except where Article 9 states otherwise,'8 a
security interest continues in collateral despite sale or other disposition of
that collateral unless that sale or other disposition is authorized by the
holder of the security interest.'7 Section 9-307(1), an exception to this
general rule, states that a buyer in the ordinary course of business' 8 takes
collateral free of a security interest created by his seller'" even though that
security interest is perfected,2 0 and even though the buyer knows of its
existence. 2' The Code defines a "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
as one who, in good faithn and without knowledge that the sale to him
violates the security interest of a third party in the goods," buys those
goods in the ordinary course of business4 from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind.n The lender, by allowing the retailer to retain
the goods covered by a security interest, loses any claim he has in goods
" See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(1); note 4 sdpra.
'7 U.C.C. § 9-306(2). See generally J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 938-45 (1972). In Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F.
Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964), the buyer of an airplane in the ordinary course of business
asserted that the bank, although holding a validly recorded security interest under § 1403 of
the FAA, waived any priority status it might have had by consenting to the sale of the plane
by the retailer to the buyer. Id. at 602. Given such consent, one need not prove he is a buyer
in the ordinary course of business in order to prevail over a federally recorded security
interest. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The court, however, did not rule on this point, instead holding
that the buyer took free of the bank's security interest due to his status as buyer in the
ordinary course of business. Id.; see note 1 supra; text accompanying notes 18-21 infra.
"See note 24 infra.
" See National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484, 485 (1967); Cun-
ningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138 N.J. Super. 489, 491, 351 A.2d 402, 404 (1975). In
National Shawmut Bank, an automobile buyer did not take free of a security interest covering
the automobile he purchased because that security interest was created by someone other
then his seller. 108 N.H. at 386, 236 A.2d at 484.
" See U.C.C. §§ 9-302; 9-304-9-306.
21 "Knowledge" under the UCC means actual knowledge. U.C.C. § 1-201(25). A buyer
in the ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest covering goods even if he
knows of the security interest, but does not know that the sale to him violates some specific
term of that interest. U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
" "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction involved. U.C.C. §
1-201(19). If the buyer of the aircraft is a merchant, such as a retailer in airplanes, he must
exhibit both honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade. U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b); 2-104(1).
" See note 21 supra.
24 U.C.C. § 1-201(9); see note 1 supra. Buying in the ordinary course of business is
commonly understood as buying out of inventory. Black v. Schenectady Discount Corp., 31
Conn. Supp. 521, 324 A.2d 921, 923 (1974); see Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138
N.J. Super. 489, 491, 351 A.2d 402, 404 (1975).
n See U.C.C. § 1-201(9); note 1 supra. The "buyer in the ordinary course" concept is
designed to facilitate the free flow of goods in commerce by making it unnecessary for such a
buyer to search title. Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 611, 220
A.2d 621, 623 (1966). Should a buyer in the ordinary course of business be forced to check
and see what security interests exist on the goods he wishes to buy, the goal of quick commer-
cial transfers will be frustrated. Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D.
Ark. 1964); see Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft Under Our Federal
System, 46 S. CAL. L. Rv. 316, 342-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sigman].
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sold by the retailer to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 6 Thus,
when a purchaser qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business,
the lender must look solely to the retailer, not to the original collateral in
the hands of the buyer, to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness secured by
the security interest.Y Underlying this result is the legislative determina-
tion that a buyer in the ordinary course of business should not be expected
to ascertain what prior interests, if any, exist on the goods he wishes to
buy.2 The purpose of UCC § 9-307(1) is to protect a buyer in the ordinary
course of business from a security interest created by his retailer, thus
facilitating the free flow of goods in commerce.29 Thus, airplane buyers in
the ordinary course of business argue that UCC § 9-307(1) compels a deter-
mination that those buyers take an airplane free of a security interest
covering that airplane created by their sellers."
Contrary to the position taken by buyers of airplanes in the ordinary
course of business, lenders assert that UCC § 9-104(a) controls the conflict
with those buyers.' UCC § 9-104(a) states that Article 9 of the Code is
preempted to the extent that a contrary federal statute applies to the
transaction.12 This section restates the rule contained in the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution.? If, as the lenders argue, § 1403
of the FAA is found to subordinate the rights of an airplane buyer in the
ordinary course of business under UCC § 9-307(1) to the claim of a feder-
ally recorded airplane security interest, § 1403, not UCC § 9-307(1), con-
trols the conflict." Courts are reluctant to preempt state statutes such as
UCC § 9-307(1), however, unless the federal statute clearly states that
preemption was intended. 35 This reluctance is due to the fact that statutes
" Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 106 R.I. 691, 694, 262 A.2d 831, 833 (1970); see U.C.C.
9-307(1); text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
v See, e.g., Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 505, 168 A.2d 600,
602 (1961).
22 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138 N.J. Super. 489, 492, 351 A.2d
402, 405 (1975); Sigman, supra note 25, at 342-43. But see Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,
3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (airplane buyer in the ordinary course of
business must search title under § 1403 of FAA).
" See note 25 supra.
3 See, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 764 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp. 3 Cal. 3d 544, 546, 476 P.2d 401, 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1970).
11 See, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 766 (W.D. Va. 1977). UCC § 9-104(a)
states: "This Article does not apply (a) to a security interest subject to any statute of the
United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties
affected by transactions in particular types of property .. " Section 9-104(a) is in accord
with the rule that state laws must not be allowed to defeat rights guaranteed under federal
law. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); U.S. CONST., art VI,
cl. 2; note 35 infra.
3 See note 31 supra; note 35 infra.
3 Compare U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (see note 31 supra) with U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
" See Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970). In Dowell, § 1403 of the FAA was found to subordinate the rights of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business to a federally recorded airplane security interest. Id. at 547, 476
P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4; see text accompanying notes 72-94 infra.
3 See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). In Rice, Illinois warehousemen challenged the validity of the Illinois
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such as UCC § 9-307(1) represent legislative action in a field traditionally
occupied by the states."
The Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (SMA)37 illustrates the structure of a
federal statute which preempts UCC § 9-307(1). A properly recorded pre-
ferred ship mortgage,38 foreclosed on in accordance with the SMA,35 is
granted priority over all other preexisting claims to the vessel, excepting
certain preferred maritime liens." Original jurisdiction for the foreclosure
of a preferred ship mortgage is granted exclusively to the district courts of
Grain Warehouse Act, asserting that the United States Warehouse Act preempted the state
act. The particular question before the Rice Court was whether the federal warehouse act
preempted the state act, or instead whether the two acts could be read so as to supplement
each other. 331 U.S. at 231. The Court determined that in order to answer the above-stated
questions, the intent of Congress had to be ascertained. Id. at 230. The Court stated that when
Congress acts in a field traditionally occupied by the states, a court must start with the
assumption that the state act was not to be p1reempted unless preemption was the clear intent
of Congress. Id. The Rice court reasoned that preemption occurs where the scheme of the
federal act is so pervasive and complete that it precludes any participation by the states. Id.
Likewise, the field legislated upon may be of such great federal interest that preemption is
necessary. Id. Thus, after examining the United States Warehouse Act, the Court concluded
that it was so comprehensive as to necessitate the conclusion that it preempted the Illinois
Act. Id. at 235-36; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952),
the petitioner challenged the prosecution's use of intercepted telephone conversations in his
trial. Texas law permitted the use of these communications in trials, while federal law prohib-
ited such use. 344 U.S. at 200. The Court disagreed with Schwartz, stating that § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act applied only to trials in federal courts. The Court stated that
it would distort the true meaning of Congress by stating that § 605 was meant to preempt
state law. Id. at 202; see note 145 infra. The Court therefore affirmed Schwarz's conviction.
344 U.S. at 204.
M See Sigman, supra note 25, at 342-43; note 35 supra.
. 46 U.S.C. 88 911-984 (1970).
u A ship mortgage is recordable under 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1970), which states in pertinent
part:
(a) No sale, conveyance, or mortgage which, at the time such sale, convey-
ance, or mortgage is made, includes a vessel of the United States, or any portion
thereof, as the whole or any part of the property sold, conveyed, or mortgaged shall
be valid, in respect to such vessel, against any person other than the grantor or
mortgagor, his heir or devisee, and a person having actual notice thereof, until such
bill of sale, conveyance, or mortgage is recorded in the office of the collector of
customs of the port of documentation of such vessel, as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
Section 921 of the Ship Mortgage Act (SMA) closely parallels § 1403(c) of the FAA. Compare
46 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1970) (see note 2 supra). A preferred ship
mortgage is defined in § 922 of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1970). To qualify as
preferred, a ship mortgage, inter alia, must include the whole vessel, must have a valid
endorsement, must be recorded under the provisions of § 921, and must contain an affidavit
stating that the mortgage was made in good faith. 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1970). A preferred ship
mortgage must be on a United States vessel. Id. See generally G. GILoRE & C. BLACK, THE
LAw oF ADMmALTY § 9-52 at 579 (1957).
=g See 46 U.S.C. § 951(b) (1970).
See 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970). A preferred maritime lien is a lien arising prior in time
to the recording and endorsement of the mortgage, or a lien for tort damages, or some wage
liens. 46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1970).
19791
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the United States.4 ' By enacting the SMA, Congress intended to encourage
lenders to invest in America's merchant marine fleet.4" The SMA sought
to accomplish this goal by granting priority to preferred ship mortgages.
4 3
Under the Act, a buyer in the ordinary course of business is not protected
should he buy a ship upon which a preferred ship mortgage has been
recorded." The purchaser of a vessel who takes title to a ship in any way
other than foreclosure in admiralty acquires imperfect title to that ship.4"
The SMA, therefore, preempts UCC § 9-307(1) through the application of
UCC § 9-104(a).46
The Federal Motor Vehicle Lien Act (FMVLA)47 is an example of a non-
46 U.S.C. § 951 (1970).
42 Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 38-39 (1934); Walter E. Heller
& Co. v. MN Mr. Ed, 270 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D. La. 1967). Before the passage of the SMA,
a security interest in a vessel was "practically worthless" because it was subordinate to all
other maritime liens, and was, therefore, wholly unacceptable to American lenders. Detroit
Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. at 39; Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage,
56 YALE L.J. 923, 937 (1947); Smith, Ship Mortgages, 47 TuL. L. Rxv. 608 (1973). The SMA
was designed to afford greater security to the holders of preferred ship mortgages by granting
them the right to cut off all claims in the vessel both prior to and subsequent to their claims
except for preferred maritime liens. See 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970); note 39 supra.
0 Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 38-39, 48 (1934); see note 40
supra.
" See 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970); note 40 supra. A buyer in the ordinary course of business
cannot use his lack of knowledge to defeat a preferred ship mortgage. Toy, Introduction to
the Law of Maritime Liens, 47 Tum. L. Rxv. 559, 564 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Toy]; see
U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
'3 Toy, supra note 44, at 565; see note 44 supra.
4, See U.C.C. § 9-104(a); note 31 supra. The UCC drafters cite the SMA as an example
of a federal statute preempting UCC § 9-307(1). UCC § 9-104, Comment 1. One case has
discussed the Ship Mortgage Act in relation to UCC § 9-104(a). See Security Bank v. Levens,
480 P.2d 706 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1971). In Security Bank, the bank loaned money to the defendant
in order that the defendant might purchase a pleasure craft. Under the terms of the security
agreement, an unauthorized sale of the vessel constituted a default. 480 P.2d at 707. The
defendant then contracted to sell the craft without plaintiffs consent. Id. Plaintiff bank then
declared the loan immediately due and payable, and the contract price of the craft was placed
in escrow. Id. Defendant contended that the Oregon enactment of UCC § 9-104(a) provides
a blanket exclusion for all ship mortgages, leaving the plaintiffs with only an action on the
promissory note. Id. at 707-08. Plaintiff asserted that UCC § 9-104(a) was not a blanket
exclusion, and argued that the provision only excluded security interests to the extent that
the Ship Mortgage Act pertains to the transaction. Id. The court agreed with the plaintiff,
finding that the secured party could pursue the rights offered him by the UCC even though
a ship mortgage was involved. Id. at 708. State law applies between parties to a non-preferred
ship mortgage. Id.
11 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II; Motor Carriers, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970). Section
313 of the Act, commonly known as the Federal Motor Vehicle Lien Act (FMVLA), provides
for the recordation of security interests in trucks, tractors, trailers, or semi-trailers having a
rated capacity of ten thousand or more pounds. Id. at § 313(a), (b). One can record a motor
vehicle security interest in three different ways, depending on the recordation procedure of
the state in which the security interest is created. Should the state in which the security
interest is created require or permit indication of such an interest on a certificate of title, such
an indication perfects that interest as to all persons in all jurisdictions. Id. at § 313(b). If the
state permits public filing of motor vehicle interests, such a filing will perfect that interest
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preempting federal security interest statute."' Prior to the passage of this
act, a holder of a security interest in a large motor vehicle"9 could only
perfects0 that interest by recording it in all jurisdictions through which the
motor vehicle might pass." Lenders were reluctant to lend to individuals
wishing to purchase such large motor vehicles due to this burdensome
requirement and the dangers it posed to their security.2 In order to facili-
tate such lending, Congress removed the multiple recordation requirement
by allowing the holder of a security interest in certain large motor vehicles
to record that interest in only one state in order to perfect it in all states.5 3
Under the FMVLA, the'recording provisions of the vehicle's home state
apply.54 Unlike the SMA, therefore, the FMVLA does not provide for fed-
eral recordation of large motor vehicle security interests or for priority
determination for such an interest.5 5 Congress clearly intended to leave
recordation and priority determination in motor vehicle financing to the
states. Consequently, the FMVLA does not grant priority to the holder
of a security interest in large motor vehicles over the claims of a buyer in
the ordinary course of business, and therefore does not preempt UCC § 9-
307(1).17
as to all persons in all jurisdictions. Id. at § 313(c). When a state provides neither a certifi-
cate of title system nor a public filing system, perfection of a motor vehicle interest shall be
governed by the law of that state. Id. at § 313(d). An interest so perfected shall be perfected
as to all persons in all jurisdictions. Id. The FMVLA is noteworthy for the fact that it contains
the first statutory definition of perfection. Id. at § 313(a)(4); see note 50 infra. See generally
G. GILMoRE, SacuRrry INTERES iN PERSONAL PROPEMRY § 13.7 at 434 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as GIMORE].
" See GILMoRE, supra note 47, § 13.7 at 432-33; Sigman, supra note 25, at 332. The
FMVLA, 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970), see note 47 supra, does not establish a federal law for large
motor vehicle security interests because perfection is established by applicable state law.
GILMoRE, supra note 47, § 13.7 at 434. The FMVLA is essentially irrelevant because of the
almost universal enactment of the UCC. See Sigman, supra note 25, at 332. Adding force to
the argument that the FMVLA does not preempt Article 9 of the UCC through the operation
of UCC § 9-104(a) is the fact that unlike the SMA, the FMVLA does not provide for federal
recordation of motor vehicle security interests. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970) with 46
U.S.C. § 921 (1970).
' See 49 U.S.C. § 313(a)(6) (1970); note 47 supra.
" See id. at § 313(a)(4); note 47 supra. "Perfection" under § 313 means the taking of
the steps or the existence of the facts required by applicable state law to make the security
interest enforceable against general creditors and subsequent lien creditors of the debtor
carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 313(a)(4) (1970). Perfection under the FMVLA is comparable to
"validation" under § 1403 of the FAA. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a); text accompanying note 127
infra. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 313(a)(4) (1970).
" See. GiLMoRE, supra note 47, § 13.7 at 431; Sigman, supra note 25, at 332. See generally
H.R. REP. No. 2534, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
3773, 3774-75.
52 GILMORE, supra note 47, § 13.7 at 431.
See 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970); note 47 supra. See generally H.R. REP. No. 2534, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3773, 3774-75.
See 49 U.S.C. § 313(b),(c),(d) (1970); note 47 supra.
' Compare 46 U.S.C. 99 921, 953(b) (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970).
"' See 49.U.S.C. § 313 (1970); GILMoRE, supra note 47, § 13.7 at 434; Sigman, supra note
25, at 332.
0 See note 56 supra.
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Section 1403 of the FAA has characteristics of both the SMA and the
FMVLA.5 1 Although the SMA and the FMVLA were enacted to encourage
and facilitate investment in their respective industries,"9 the acts' are
viewed as opposites regarding preemption of state priority law.60 The SMA
is viewed as a federally preempting statute under UCC § 9-104(a),' be-
cause it provides for federal recordation of ship mortgages 2 and grants
priority to an interest so recorded.A3 The FMVLA, due to its lack of priority
determinative language" and its reliance on state recording provisions, 5 is
not viewed as federally preempting. 6 Courts are split, however, on the
issue of whether § 1403 of the FAA, a statute providing for federal recorda-
tion like the SMA, but silent on priorities like the FMVLA, preempts UCC
§ 9-307(1)." 7
Section 1403 provides that no conveyance or other instrument concern-
ing aircraft shall be valid against any person other than the parties to the
conveyance or instrument, their heirs and devisees, and those with actual
knowledge of the conveyance or instrument, unless that conveyance or
instrument is recorded with the Federal Aviation Agency.6 Section 1403
provides the exclusive method for recording airplane security interests,
thus validating them." If an airplane security interest is not recorded with
Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970) (see note 2 supra) with 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970) and
46 U.S.C. § 921 (1970).
' See notes 42 & 48 supra.
See GILMORE, supra note 47, §§ 13.2 & 13.7 at 405, 434; Sigman, supra note 25, at 327-
28, 331-32.
" See U.C.C. § 9-104, Comment 1; note 46 suprd. Cf. Security Bank v. Levens, 480 P.2d
706, 707-09 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1971) (court must resort to state law in event that ship mortgage is
not preferred).
62 See 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1970); note 38 supra.
a See 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970); note 39 supra.
" See 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970); note 47 supra; text accompanying note 54 supra.
" See 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970); note 47 supra. The import of § 313 is to confer national
effect on state perfection systems. Sigman, supra note 25, at 332.
" See note 56 supra.
" Most courts which have considered the question have held that § 1403 only preempts
state filing provisions and not the priority advantages given buyers in the ordinary course of
business under UCC § 9-307(1). See, e.g., Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086
(3d Cir. 1978); Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977); Northern Ill. Corp. v.
Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide,
235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank, 139 Ind.
App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966). One court, however, has held that § 1403 preempts both
state filing provisions and UCC § 9-307(1). See Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d
544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). Another court, without referring to UCC § 9-307(1),
held that § 1403 completely preempts Article 9 of the UCC. See Smith v. Eastern Airmotive
Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 (1968). Smith, however, was later overruled. See
Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 261 A.2d 399 (1970).
Cases decided unde; § 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, §
503(a)(b), 52 Stat. 1006 (1938), the predecessor of § 1403, reached a result similar to Dowell
and Smith. See In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948); Dawson v.
General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950).
49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); see note 2 supra.
66 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); see, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 766 (W.D. Va.
1977); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Southern
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the Federal Aviation Agency it is invalid against third parties unless they
had actual knowledge of the security interest."
Lenders, however, have sought to convince courts that § 1403 should
be read as more than simply a recordation provision.7' Holders of airplane
security interests have asserted that besides providing the only method
through which an airplane security interest can be validated, § 1403 grants
priority to an airplane security interest recorded under its provisions over
the claim of a buyer in the ordinary course of business.2 This interpreta-
tion preempts UCC § 9-307(1) through the operation of UCC § 9-104(a).
73
Some courts have found this preemption argument persuasive. 4
In Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.,75 the leading case accepting the
preemption argument, the California Supreme Court gave priority to a
lender's prior federally recorded security interest over a claim of a buyer
in the ordinary course of business.7" Nevadair, an airplane distributor,
Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 377, 261 A.2d 399, 406 (1970);
see note 2 supra. The drafters of the UCC state that § 1403 is an example of a federal statute
which preempts UCC filing provisions. UCC § 9-302, Comment 8.
,0 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); see note 2 supra.
11 See, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 766 (W.D. Va. 1977); Texas Nat'l Bank
v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 602 (E.D. Ark 1964); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3
Cal.3d 544, 546, 476 P.2d 401, 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1970). The holder of a federally recorded
airplane security interest, in order to prevail over the buyer of that airplane, can pursue a
number of courses. The holder of the security interest can assert that the buyer was not a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. If successful, this argument strips the buyer of the
protection afforded by UCC § 9-307(1). Cf. Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction,
Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 159, 208 A.2d 290, 292 (1965) (buyer not a buyer in the ordinary
course of business because he did not buy out of inventory). Most cases dealing with conflicts
between a buyer and the holder of a federally recorded airplane security interest either
assume or state that the buyer is one in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., Haynes v.
GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 765 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d
544, 546, 476 P.2d 401, 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1970). If the lender is unable to establish that
the buyer was not one in the ordinary course of business, the lender must then attempt to
prove that the buyer, despite his status as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, does
not take free of the security interest because § 1403 preempts UCC § 9-307(1). See Haynes v.
GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 765 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d
544, 546, 476 P.2d 401, 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1970). This argument has both succeeded and
failed in the courts. See note 67 supra.
"I See U.C.C. § 9-104(a); note 31 supra. Any federal statute that is found to affect
the parties to a transaction preempts Article 9 to the extent it purports to do so. U.C.C. §
9-104(a). Should § 1403 grant priority to a federally recorded security interest, UCC § 9-
307(1) is preempted. See Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); text accompanying notes 73-95 infra.
73 See note 70 supra.
11 See Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970). Cf. In re Veteran's Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948) (decided under §
503 of CAA); Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950)
(decided under § 503 of CAA).
11 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
76 Id. at 551-52, 476,P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5. The Dowell Court vacated a California
Court of Appeals judgment declaring that the buyer in the ordinary course of business held
title to the airplane free of a federally recorded security interest covering that airplane. See
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 798, 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, vacated, 3 Cal., 3d
544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
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delivered a new airplane to Tanger, an airplane retailer, pursuant to a
conditional sales contract entered into by both parties." The contract of
sale stated that Tanger was not to sell the plane without Nevadair's con-
sent, and that Nevadair retained a security interest in the airplane to the
extent of the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereon.7 8 Nevadair then
assigned its security interest to Beech Acceptance Corporation, an aircraft
financier." Beech recorded this security interest with the Federal Aviation
Agency under § 1403.80 Dowell, a buyer in the ordinary course of business,8'
subsequently purchased an airplane covered by this security interest from
Tanger.8 When Beech was notified that Tanger had sold the airplane to
Dowell, Beech and Nevadair removed the airplane from Dowell's posses-
sion.' Dowell then brought suit to establish his title to the airplane.84
The Dowell court recognized that an airplane buyer in the ordinary
course of business takes his airplane free of a security interest covering that
airplane unless § 1403 preempts UCC § 9-307(1).1 The court, in determin-
ing that § 1403 does so preempt, found that § 1403 has a dual purpose.80
" 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 1-2. The airplane, a new Beechcraft
Bonanza, was sold by its manufacturer to Nevadair, a distributor. Id., 476 P.2d at 401, 91
Cal. Rptr. at 1-2; see note 5 supra; note 101 infra.
7' Id. at 548, 476 P.2d at 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
7, Id. at 546, 476 P.2d at 401-02, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
Id., 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2; see note 2 supra. Beech recorded both the
security interest and its assignment to Beech. 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 2; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
11 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 3; see U.C.C. § 9-307(1); note 4 supra.
The California version of UCC § 9-307(1) does not vary from the Uniform Act. Compare
U.C.C. 9-307(1) with CAL. COM. CODE § 9307 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
11 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2. Dowell paid the $30,000 purchase
price in full. 3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
'1 Id. at 547, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2. Under the terms of the conditional sales
contract, Tanger was prohibited from selling the airplane without Beech's consent. See text
accompanying note 78 supra. Tanger, however, did sell the airplane without Beech's consent,
and did not notify Beech of the sale until two months afterwards. 3 Cal. 3d at 546-47, 476
P.2d at 401-02, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
11 3 Cal. 3d at 547, 476 P.2d at 402, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 2. The California Court of Appeals
affirmed the Superior Court's decision granting Dowell title to the airplane and $175 in
compensatory damages, but reversed the $1,000 in punitive damages awarded Dowell by the
Superior Court. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 798, 801, 84 Cal. Rptr.
654, 664 (1970). The state supreme court reversed on all issues. 3 Cal. 3d at 552, 476 P.2d at
406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
'1 3 Cal. 3d at 549, 476 P.2d at 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 3; see CAL. COM. CODE § 9307 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978); note 81 supra.
" 3 Cal. 3d at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5. The Dowell court found that §
1403 was intended both to simplify the task of recording an airplane security interest and to
protect the holders of interests so recorded. Id. at 551, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
The court, in formulating this dual purpose, relied on the construction given § 1403 in two
California appellate court decisions, International Atlas Serv., Inc. v. Twentieth Century
Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968)
and Pope v. National Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965). In Atlas,
defendant manufacturer sold an airplane to a retailer and retained a security interest in the
airplane which was recorded under § 1403. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
Plaintiff, an airplane maintenance.and repair service, then performed services on the airplane
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According to the court, Congress enacted § 1403 in order to simplify the
confused field of aircraft security interest recordation by establishling a
central filing office.87 Dowell further reasoned that § 1403 was enacted to
protect the holders of airplane security interests. 8 8 Accordingly, the court
concluded that neither of these purposes was served if buyers in the ordi-
nary course of business could defeat a federally recorded security interest
through a mechanical operation of UCC § 9-307(1).8 After developing this
policy foundation, the court reasoned that because Beech had recorded its
security interest under § 1403, Dowell had constructive notice of that secu-
rity interest and should have searched title." Thus, the Dowell court
awarded possession of the airplane to the secured party over the claim of
the buyer in the ordinary course of business."
Although admitting that cases holding for the buyer in the ordinary
course of business in similar circumstances had strong appeal from a policy
perspective,"2 the court refused to "apply state law in a manner virtually
for which it was not compensated. The retailer subsequently defaulted on his obligation to
the manufacturer, and Twentieth Century repossessed the plane. Atlas then sued Twentieth
Century for the value of its unpaid services. Id., 59 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court, faced with
this conflict between the wholesaler and the mechanical service, held tor the wholesaler. Id.,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 497. The court reasoned that all California law relating to title and liens to
personal property in airplane component parts had been superseded by § 1403. Id., 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 497. The Atlas court proceeded to set forth its construction of § 1403, deciding that
its provisions were intended to "bring order into the field of aircraft ownership and finance
... [and to] set up a comprehensive system of centralized recordation, which, if properly
used, provides adequate protection for all substantial property interests in large air-
craft. . . ." Id., 59 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
In Pope v. National Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965), the
holder of an airplane security interest failed to record that interest until after such time as
plaintiffs claimed an ownership right in the plane. Id. at 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 238, 240-41.
The security interest, therefore, was not properly validated until such time. Id., 46 Cal. Rptr.
at 241; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra. Nonetheless, the court held for National
Aero Finance, stating that it would violate the purpose of the federal act to permit Pope, who
did not record his ownership interest, to prevail over National Aero Finance, which lent
money on the strength of another's recorded title to the airplane and later recorded its
interest. 236 Cal. App. 2d at 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 241. The lesson in Pope is caveat emp-
tor-record quickly. The Pope court essentially construed § 1403 as a race statute, holding
for National Aero Finance because it recorded first. Neither Atlas nor Pope, however, deal
with the conflict between a recorded airplane security interest and a subsequent buyer in the
ordinary course of business who has recorded his claim to the airplane. See Haynes v. GECC,
432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977).
3 Cal. 3d at 550, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5; see note 86 supra.
M 3 Cal. 3d at 550, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5; see note 86 supra.
3 Cal. 3d at 550-51, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
N Id. at 549, 476 P.2d at 404, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
, Id. at 552, 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
, Id., 476 P.2d at 405-06, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6. The Dowell court cited Northern Ill. Corp.
v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968), and Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufder-
heide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964), as cases reaching a contrary conclusion to that
reached in Dowell. 3 Ca). 3d at 552, 476 P.2d at 205-06, 9i Cal. Rptr. at 5-6. Both Northern
Ill. and Texas Nat'l Bank protected a buyer in the ordinary course of a business from a prior
federally recorded airplane security interest. See 284 F. Supp. at 125; 235 F. Supp. at 604;
note 17 supra.
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ignoring the existence of the federal system."9 The Dowell court stated
that if federally recorded security interests were not protected against the
claims of buyers in the ordinary course of business who fail to search title,
federal policy favoring such security interests would be frustrated. 4 Addi-
tionally, the court was concerned that should priority not be granted to
federally recorded security interests, buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness would "cavalierly decline" to search title so as to avoid "actual no-
tice" as defined in UCC § 9-307(1). 5 The Dowell court, therefore, found
the federal policy behind § 1403 so strong as to necessitate the conclusion
that § 1403 preempted UCC § 9-307(1).11 Most courts, however, have disa-
greed with the Dowell analysis. 7
Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp. (GECC)I9 represents the con-
trary position to Dowell, and the majority view.9 M.D. Aircraft Co.
(M.D.), a retailer, purchased a used airplane from one Peebles.,"' To fi-
nance this transaction, M.D. obtained a loan from GECC, the newly ac-
quired airplane serving as collateral securing the loan.' °' GECC immedi-
ately recorded its security interest with the Federal Aviation Agency under
§ 1403. 12 Haynes, a buyer in the ordinary course of business,'"" subse-
quently bought the airplane from M.D. and recorded his purchase under
§ 1403.'1" Upon learning of GECC's interest in the airplane, Haynes insti-
tuted a declaratory judgment action to determine whether he purchased
the airplane free of GECC's federally recorded security interest.' Haynes
asserted that § 1403 did not grant priority to an airplane security interest
recorded under that section's provisions, and did not preempt UCC § 9-
307(1)."'I Accordingly, Haynes argued that he should prevail over GECC's
security interest because of his status as a buyer in the ordinary course of
" 3 Cal. 3d at 550, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); notes 31 & 35 supra.
" 3 Cal. 3d at 550, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
' Id., 476 P.2d at 406, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5; see note 21 supra.
3 Cal. 3d at 551-52, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
" See note 67 supra.
432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977).
" 432 F. Supp. at 768; see note 67 supra.
00 432 F. Supp. at 763-64; see text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
,01 432 F. Supp. at 764. M.D. executed a note payable to GECC in the amount of $26,000.
M.D. and GECC then entered into a security agreement, see UCC § 9-105(1)(1), in which the
airplane or the proceeds from the airplane's sale were to serve as collateral securing the loan.
432 F. Supp. at 764; see note 5 supra. The security agreement in Haynes did not prohibit the
sale of the collateral by the retailer without the consent of the holder of the security interest,
as did the security agreement in Dowell. 432 F. Supp. at 768; see notes 75 & 80 supra.
IQ2 432 F. Supp. at 764; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
1" 432 F. Supp. at 765-66; see U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9); 9-307(1); note 1 supra; text accom-
panying notes 18-21 supra. Virginia's version of UCC § 9-307(1) is identical to the Uniform
Act. Compare U.C.C. § 9-307(1) with VA. CODE § 8.9-307(1). See note 81 supra.
1*1 432 F. Supp. at 764; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
I's 432 F. Supp. at 763. After Haynes purchased the airplane, GECC informed him that
the airplane was covered by GECC's security interest, and that there was an unpaid balance
of $26,000, plus interest, on the security interest. Id. at 764.
'1 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); U.C.C. §§ 9-104(a); 9-307(1); notes 4 & 31 supra.
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business.10 GECC, using the Dowell rationale, asserted that § 1403
preempts UCC § 9-307(1) because of the strong policy of protection behind
the federal act.08 The Haynes court disagreed, holding that under state
priority law, Haynes held title to the airplane free of GECC's interest. 0"
The Haynes court rejected Dowell, finding that § 1403 was enacted
merely to provide a convenient central place for the recordation of aircraft
security interests, and not to grant such a recorded interest priority over
the claim of a buyer in the ordinary course of business.""0 The Haynes court
observed that the wording of § 14d3 defeats any attempt to characterize
that section as priority determinative and preemptive."' The court stated
that § 1403 is directed to validation of a security interest, not to a priority
determination of that interest."2 As further support for its conclusion, the
Haynes court cited the legislative history of § 1403 and that of its legisla-
tive predecessor, § 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA).' Sec-
,o See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9); 9-307(1); notes 1 & 4 supra.
'' 432 F. Supp. at 766. Defendant GECC, unlike Beech Acceptance Corp. in Dowell,
specifically relied on UCC § 9-104(a) in order to argue that UCC § 9-307(1) had been
preempted. Id. GECC asserted that UCC § 9-104(a) excludes aircraft security interests from
the coverage of Article 9 because the field of aircraft secured transactions had been preempted
by § 1403. Id. The Haynes court, disagreeing with this conclusion, stated that Article 9 of
the UCC is preempted only if § 1403 grants priority to a federally recorded airplane security
interest. Id.; see note 35 supra.
"1' 432 F. Supp. at 769. The Court determined that the prior position of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business triumphed over the secured party relying on § 1403. Id. at 767-
69.
Il0 432 F. Supp. at 765, 768. The Haynes court agreed with Dowell that § 1403 was meant
to provide a central place for the recording of aircraft security interests. 432 F. Supp. at 765;
see note 86 supra. The Haynes court, however, rejected DoweU's conclusion that § 1403 was
meant to protect the holders of the airplane security interests by granting their interests
priority over the claims of a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 432 F. Supp. at 765;
see text accompanying note 86 supra.
"' 432 F. Supp. at 765; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
112 See note 111 supra.
"1 432 F. Supp. at 766-67; see Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, §
503(a),(b), 52 Stat. 1006 (1938). In 1964, however, an amendment to § 1403 was proposed
which, if passed, might have preempted UCC § 9-307(1). See HEARINGS ON AmcArr TrrLs
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TRANSPORTATION AND AERONAUTICS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN ComMERCE, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 885-86 (1964). Various Congressmen, however,
were concerned that this proposed amendment might grant priority to a federally recorded
security interest over all other claims. Id. Replying to these reservations, a representative of
the Federal Aviation Agency stated that a federally recorded security interest never had, and
would not have by virtue of this proposed amendment, priority over all other claims. Id.
Despite the probative value of these comments, however, the views of a subsequent Congress
regarding the acts of an earlier Congress are not given great weight. See Waterman S.S. Corp.
v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1964); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82
(1947). Introduction of a subsequently rejected amendment is not permissible to show the
intent of the Congress which passed the original act. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,
411 (1961); Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 13 (1950). But see Dowell v. Beech Accept-
ance Corp., 4 Cal. App., 3d 798, 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). This proposed amendment, although of little weight in court, is academic
evidence of lack of preemptive congressional intent.
Faced with the silence of § 1403 and its legislative history on the priority question, some
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tion 1403 of the FAA reenacted § 503 of the CAA without substantial
change."' The legislative history of § 503 indicates no congressional intent
to determine priority."-
The Haynes court was further persuaded by UCC § 9-104(a) and an
Official Comment thereto."' Written before the enactment of the FAA, the
Comment states that although § 503 of the CAA preempts UCC filing
provisions, to the extent that § 503 does not regulate the rights of the
parties affected by a transaction, airplane security interests remain subject
to UCC Article 9.117 The Comment further states that legislation covering
airplane financing, proposed to Congress in 1958, would preempt Article 9
if passed."" Observing that this all-inclusive legislation was never passed,
the Haynes court concluded that the.Code drafters viewed § 503 and § 1403
as non-preemptive." 9 In addition, the Haynes court found that the state
policy favoring a buyer in the ordinary course of business is so strong as to
necessitate a holding for such a buyer. 20 The court reasoned that an air-
plane buyer in the ordinary course of business should be allowed to assume
that his retailer has the right to sell the airplane free of all security inter-
courts have seen fit to search the legislative history of § 503 for aid on the priority question.
See Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 766-67 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech Acceptance
Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 798, 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970); Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 377-78,
261 A.2d 399, 403 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra. The legislative history of §
503 of the C.A.A. is far more helpful on the priority question than is that of its successor.
See HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, TO CREATE A CIvm AERONAUTICS
AuTHoRrry, H.R. Doc. No. 9738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406-07 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
HEAINGS]. This history states that § 503 of the C.A.A. was enacted to protect holders of
airplane security interests by providing a central place for the recordation of those interests.
Id. at 406. But see note 86 supra. Other legislative history of § 503 strongly indicates that §
503 was not intended to grant priority to a federally recorded airplane security interest. See
S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1001 (1938); 83 CONG. REc. 6757 (1938); notes 139 &
144 infra.
" See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 3741, 3743; text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
1 432 F. Supp. at 765-66; see note 113 supra; note 144 infra.
"' 432 F. Supp. at 766. Section 8.9-104(a) of the Virginia Code contains the old UCC
comment, written before the enactment of 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970). The Comment states that
to the extent that § 503 of the CAA does not regulate the rights of parties affected by airplane
secured transactions, such security interests remain subject to Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-104,
Comment 1 (1958); see note 31 supra. UCC Comments, however, are not law and can only
be used as an interpretive aid.
"1 See U.C.C. § 9-104, Comment 1 (1958).
"' See note 117 supra.
"' 432 F. Supp. at 766.
'2 Id. at 767. The Haynes court's explanation as to why policy considerations favoring
the buyer in the ordinary course of business are relevant to the preemption question is not
clear. Once the Haynes court found a lack of preemptive Congressional intent in § 1403, the
discussion of state policy favoring a buyer in the ordinary course of business was not necessary
to the court's decision. The Haynes court, in this discussion, might have meant to say that
the state policy favoring the buyer in the ordinary course of business was so strong that, to
preempt it, more of a Congressional expression of preemptive intent would be needed than is
contained in § 1403. See note 35 supra.
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ests.'1' Thus, the court decided that because GECC decided to leave the
plane in the retailer's possession, GECC, not Haynes, should bear the loss
occasioned by the retailer's default.12
The Dowell court found § 1403 preemptive due to the strong expression
of federal policy within the statute. 12 The Haynes court found no such
expression, and therefore subordinated the federally recorded security in-
terest to the ownership rights of the buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.' 2 The holdings of the courts are based upon their divergent conclu-
sions regarding the purpose of and policy behind § 1403.'2
The language of § 1403 concerns only the validity of a federally recorded
airplane security interest.2 , Validation of an airplane security interest does
not equal a granting of priority to that interest.'2 Unless recorded under §
1403, an aircraft security interest is invalid as to any other person other
than the parties to the security interest, their heirs and devisees, and those
with actual notice thereof.'2 In this respect, the language of § 1403 is much
like that of the FMVLA.'12 Neither act addresses the issues of priority
determination or preemption in their language, as does the SMA.35 The
2 432 F. Supp. at 767. The Haynes court cited State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enter.,
Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966), United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. WTAE Flying
Club, 300 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1969), Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F.
Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968), and Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D.
Ark. 1964), as supporting the proposition that the buyer in the ordinary course of business
should prevail. 432 F. Supp. at 767. The Haynes court's citation of State Securities, however,
is puzzling. In State Securities, the holder of an airpla ne security interest not recorded under
§ 1403 brought suit to foreclose on an airplane sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business. State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enter., Inc., 355 F.2d at 226. The failure to record
an airplane security interest invalidates that interest as to buyers in the ordinary course of
business. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); see note 2 supra. Thus, the State Securities court concluded
that, under state law, the buyer must prevail against the unrecorded interest. 355 F.2d at
229. The State Securities case is clearly not on point, and merely serves to confuse the real
issue of whether § 1403 preempts UCC § 9-307(1) when the recording provisions of § 1403
have been followed. See note 17 supra.
21 432 F. Supp. at 767; see note 119 supra.
'2 Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 548, 476 P.2d 401, 405, 91 Cal. Rptr.
1, 5 (1970); see note 86 supra.
'2 432 F. Supp. at 767; see note 110 supra.
"I See notes 86 & 110 supra.
221 Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. at 765; see 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
'2 432 F. Supp. at 768; see Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skyways Enter., Inc., 23 U.C.C. Rptr.
1015, 1017 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1978); Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR. L. & COMM.
193, 203 (1958); note 50 supra.
'2 See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra.
2" Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1970) (see note 2 supra) with 49 U.S.C. § 313(b),(c),(d)
(1970). See note 47 supra. The legislative history of § 313 indicates that § 1403 was the model
from which § 313 was drafted. See H.R. REP. No. 2354, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in
[1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3773, 3774. Section 1403 provides for federal recorda-
tion, however, while § 313 does not. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1970) with 49 U.S.C. §
313(b),(c),(d) (1970). See text accompanying note 55 supra.
118 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970) (see note 2 supra) and 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1970) (see
note 47 supra) with 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970). See note 39 supra. The recording provisions of
the Ship Mortgage Act are similar to those of § 1403. Cf. Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537,
51 S.E.2d 610, 616 (1940) (recording provisions of Ship Mortgage Act similar to § 503 of the
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SMA, besides providing for the validation of ship mortgages, grants prior-
ity to a properly recorded preferred ship mortgage.' 3 Thus, the SMA sets
forth a strong basis in its language for finding that statute priority determi-
native.'3 1 The Haynes court recognized that the language of § 1403 cannot
be read as broadly as that of the SMA, concluding that § 1403 is not
preemptive.' The Dowell court did not discuss the language of § 1403,
instead basing its decision on the strong expression of federal policy the
court found in the legislative history of that section.'
34
Both the Dowell court and the Haynes court cite the purpose of § 1403
and its predecessor, § 503 of the CAA, as support for their holdings."" Since
the legislative history of § 1403 merely states that § 1403 reenacts § 503 of
the CAA without substantial change,'3 1 many courts have looked to § 503
for aid on the priority question.' 37 The history of § 503 reveals a clear
legislative intent that priority determination between a federally recorded
security interest and the claim of a buyer in the ordinary course of business
was to be left to state law.'3 1 Section 503, as originally proposed, would
have granted a federally recorded security interest priority over all other
claims to the airplane.' 3 This priority determinative language was struck
from § 503 by Senate amendment.' As expressed by Haynes, the legisla-
C.A.A.). Section 1403, however, contains no priority provisions similar to § 953(b) of the Ship
Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1970). See note 39 supra.
"I' See 46 U.S.C. §§ 921; 953(b) (1970); text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
132 See note 39 supra; text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
13 432 F. Supp. at 765.
131 See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
13 See 432 F. Supp. at 766-67; 3 Cal. 3d at 548, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
'5' See note 113 supra.
' See Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763, 766-67 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 798, 84 Cal. Rptr. 654, vacated, 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d
401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super.
369, 377-78, 261 A.2d 399, 403 (1970); note 113 supra.
1-'1 See HEARINGS, supra note 113, at 406-07; S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1001
(1938); 83 CONG. REc. 6757 (1938); note 147 infra. Section 503 of the CAA was enacted to
protect holders of aircraft interests by providing a central place for the filing of such interests.
See HEARINGS, supra note 113, at 407. Prior to the enactment of § 503, holders of airplane
security interests had to validate that interest in every jurisdiction in order to validate it in
all jurisdictions. Holders of airplane security interests who failed to record their interests as
stated above jeopardized their interest. Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. at 765. Section 503
of the CAA and its successor, § 1403 of the FAA, alleviated this problem by permitting the
holder of an airplane security interest to record that interest only once, in a central place, in
order to validate it in all jurisdictions. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); note 2 supra. Prior to
the final enactment of § 503, that section would have granted an airplane security interest
validity and priority if recorded under § 503. See S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1001
(1938). This priority determinative language was struck from § 503. See 83 CONG. REc. 6757
(1938); note 139 infra. Neither § 503 nor § 1403 was intended by Congress to be priority
determinative.
I" See S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1001 (1938). The original section stated in
pertinent part: "Every instrument so recorded [with the CAA under § 5031 shall have
priority over all other claims arising after July 1, 1939, against the aircraft subject thereto."
(emphasis added)
"I See 83 CONG. REc. 6757 (1938).
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tive history of § 503 indicates that § 503 was enacted primarily to simplify
the task of recording an airplane security interest and thereby establishing
the validity of that interest, not to grant priority to an aircraft security
interest so recorded.'
4 '
Although the Dowell court disagreed with the Haynes' court's finding
of legislative intent, it gave only a vague explanation of its determination
as to priority under § 1403.42 The court was unable to find support for its
position in the legislative histories of either § 1403 or § 503.' 41 In fact, the
Dowell court's reasoning ignores the absence of a legislative manifestation
of concern with priority.' When a federal statute and a state statute
conflict, it ". . . will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended
to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear
manifestation of intention to do so.' The Dowell court, ignoring this
familiar rule, substituted its own interpretation of § 1403 for that of Con-
gress.'46 Faced with the lack of any evidence of a priority determinative
congressional intent in either § 1403 or its history,'47 the Dowell court
should have found that § 1403 does not preempt UCC § 9-307(1).
The resolution of the conflict between the holder of a federally recorded
airplane security interest and the buyer of that airplane in the ordinary
course of business hinges on the court's detekmination of the meaning of §
1403 and its legislative history.'48 The Haynes court decided that § 1403
and the relevant legislative history cannot be read to preempt UCC § 9-
307(1).1 9 Section 1403 and its history support this finding. Dowell recog-
' 432 F. Supp. at 766-67; see note 138 supra.
"' 3 Cal. 3d at 548, 476 P.2d at 405, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 5; see note 86 supra. Dowell fails to
cite the legislative histories of either § 1403 or § 503. The two cases principally relied on by
Dowell also fail to cite these histories. See International Atlas Serv., Inc. v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967); Pope v. National Aero Fin.
Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965).
"t See note 142 supra.
See notes 138 & 139 supra. Despite the fact that the Dowell court, as well as the Atlas
and Pope courts, did not cite to the legislative history of either § 1403 or § 503, see note 142
supra, one must assume that all those courts were aware of the existence of that history. If
that history were misinterpreted by a court, the history could provide the basis for a pre-
emption argument. The history of § 503 reveals that § 503 was intended to protect the
holders of aircraft security interests recorded under § 503. See HEAmINGs, supra note 113, at
406-07. The Dowell court could have interpreted the term "protect," as meaning the grant-
ing of priority to such a federally recorded interest. Upon a careful reading of that history
and the reasons behind the passage of § 503, however, such an interpretation of the term
"protect" is inappropriate. Holders of aircraft security interests were protected under § 503,
and are protected under § 1403, by having available the central recording office established
by both sections. Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. at 765. Section 1403 protects the holder of
an airplane security interest by granting his interest nationwide validity through one recorda-
tion in a central office, whereas before 1938 no such protection existed. See note 138 supra.
" Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952); see note 35 supra.
Ij See notes 86 & 144 supra.
' See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); notes 2, 138 & 144 supra.
"' See, e.g., Haynes v. GECC, 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977); Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); Southern Jersey
Airways, Inc. v. National Bank, 108 N.J. Super. 369, 261 A.2d 399 (1970).
"1 432 F. Supp. at 766-67; see note 113 supra.
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nized that to find for the holder of a federally recorded aircraft security
interest, a strong expression of federal intent to protect such a holder by
granting his interest priority had to be constructed.50 The Dowell court
constructed this intent, 5' but did so by ignoring the real purpose of and
policy behind § 1403, which is to provide a central place where airplane
security interests can be federally recorded and validated,5 2 and nothing
more.
DAVID F. BRANDLEY, JR.
3 Cal. 3d at 546, 476 P.2d at 403, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
151 See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
1 See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970); notes 2 & 138 supra.
